Preface

This book is a revision of *Public Choice II.* In revising the book, I have largely retained the structure of *Public Choice II* - most of the material contained in that volume reappears in this one. In some cases, this has resulted in very modest changes in a chapter and in quite substantial changes in others. Several new chapters have been written to cover topics that have cropped up or increased in importance since the previous edition was written. I have also attempted to retain the same level of difficulty as the previous version. Because the literature has become continuously more theoretical and mathematical, more mathematics appears in the new material than in the previous text, and the distinction between "easy" and "difficult" sections denoted by a * has become more arbitrary. Some may question my decision not to drop more material from the previous text, where little new work has appeared, to leave more space for new material. I have chosen not to go this route because I still think of the book as a survey of *all* of the major topics in public choice. That little new has appeared concerning Arrow impossibility theorems in recent years does not imply that the issues raised by this work are any less important, or that they should be omitted in a basic course in public choice - or so I believe.

Public Choice III represents a substantial expansion of its predecessor, just as *Public Choice II* was a substantial expansion of its forerunner. Nevertheless, the fraction of the literature covered adequately by *Public Choice III* is far smaller than that of the earlier versions of the text. I fear that many readers will feel that I have done an inadequate job of covering this or that topic, or that I have unfairly neglected some important contributions. I apologize for such omissions. To keep the book within reasonable bounds, I have had to shortchange some questions and authors.

Those familiar with *Public Choice II may* find the following summary of changes helpful.

Chapter in PC III	Relationship to PC II
1	Modest revision of Ch. 1
2	Revised version of Ch. 2
3	Substantial revision of Chs. 3 and 23
4	Revised version of Ch. 4
5	Revised version of Ch. 5
6	Modest revision of Ch. 6
7	Modest revision of Ch. 7
8	Modest revision of Ch. 8
9	Modest revision of Ch. 9
10	New chapter
11	Revised version of Ch. 10
12	Revised version of Ch. 11
13	Substantial revision of Ch. 12
14	Revised version of Ch. 18
15	Substantial revision of Ch. 13
16	Revised version of Ch. 14
17	New chapter
18	New chapter
19	Substantial revision of Ch. 15
20	Substantial revision of Ch. 16 with additional material from Ch. 11
21	Revised version of Ch. 17
22	New chapter
23	Modest revision of Ch. 19
24	Modest revision of Ch. 20
25	Revised version of Ch. 21
26	Substantial revision of Ch. 22, almost a new chapter
27	New chapter that expands the material from Sec. C of old Ch. 20
28	New chapter
29	Modest revision of Ch. 24

I would like to thank several authors and publishers who have been kind enough to allow me to reproduce a figure or table from one of their publications.

1. Material from tables 1 and 3 in Avinash Dixit and Mancur Olson. 2000. "Does Voluntary Participation Undermine the Coase Theorem?" *Journal of Public Economics,* 76 (June): 309-35. Elsevier Science.
2. Material from tables 1 and 3 in Asa Hansson and Charles Stuart. Forthcoming. "Peaking of Fiscal Sizes of Government," *European Journal of Political Economy.* Elsevier Science.
3. Figures 5.7b, 5.13, and 5.20b from Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C Ordeshook. 1987. "A Decade of Experimental Research of Spatial Models of Elections and Committees," in J. M. Enelow and M. J. Hinich, eds. *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 99-144.
4. Material from table in Norman Schofield. 1993. "Political Competition in Multiparty Coalition Governments," *European Journal of Political Research,* 23: 1-3. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

5. Material from table on page 91 of Ulrich Koester and Stefan Tangermann. 1990. "The European Community," in F. H. Sanderson, ed. *Agricultural Protection in the Industrial World*. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, pp. 64-111.
6. Material from tables 10.1 and 10.3 in Dennis C Mueller. 1996. *Constitutional Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Substantial portions of Dennis C Mueller. 2001. "The Importance of Uncertainty in a Two-Stage Theory of Constitutions," *Public Choice,* 108, (Sept.): 223-58. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
8. Material from table 3.3.2 in Friedrich Schneider and Dominik H. Enste. 1998. "Increasing Shadow Economies All over the World - Fiction or Reality?" Mimeo. University of Linz.
9. Figure 6.1 in Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle. 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Material from table 15.13 in Wolfgang C Miiller and Kaare Strom, eds. 2000. *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11. Material from table C of the appendix to Gary W Cox. 1997. *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12. Material from figure 4.1 in Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Putting together a manuscript of this size and scope involves a tremendous amount of effort to keep track of references, draw figures, construct and check tables, and the like. I have been extremely fortunate both at the University of Maryland and now here in Vienna to have been able to work with two excellent secretaries. My heartfelt thanks goes to Heide Wurm for all that she has done to help bring this book to fruition.

Dennis C. Mueller
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