Mueller PC III

Ch.1 Introduction

Part I Origins of the State

Ch.2 The Reason for Collective Choice - Allocative Efficiency

Ch.3 The Reason for Collective Choice - Redistribution

Part II Public Choice in a Direct Democracy

Ch.4 The Choice of Voting Rule

Ch.5 Majority Rule - Positive Properties

Ch.6 Majority Rule - Normative Properties

Ch.7 Simple Alternatives to Majority Rule

Ch.8 Complicated Alternatives to Majority Rule

Ch.9 Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty

Part III Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

Ch.10 Federalism

Ch.11 Two-Party Competition - Deterministic Voting

Ch.12 Two-Party Competition - Probabilistic Voting

Ch.13 Multiparty Systems

Ch.14 The Paradox of Voting

Ch.15 Rent Seeking

Ch.16 Bureaucracy

Ch.17 Legislatures and Bureaucracies

Ch.18 Dictatorship

Part IV Applications and Testing

Ch.19 Political Competition and Macroeconomic Performance

Ch.20 Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions, and Lobbying

Ch.21 The Size of Government

Ch.22 Government Size and Economic Performance

Part V Normative Public Choice

Ch.23 Social Welfare Functions

Ch.24 The Impossibility of a Social Ordering

Ch.25 A Just Social Contract

Ch.26 The Constitution as a Utilitarian Contract

Ch.27 Liberal Rights and Social Choices

Part VI What Have We Learned?

Ch.28 Has Public Choice Contributed Anything to the Study of Politics?

Ch.29 Allocation, Redistribution, and Public Choice

06 сен 2006